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REMEDIES FOR STATUTORY VIOLATIONS UNDER
SECTIONS 1983 AND 1985(C)
2
The growing number of federal claimst based on the remedial statutes
of the Civil Rights Act of 18711 (1871 Act) is forcing the federal court
system to reexamine the intended scope of the statutes.4 The
Reconstruction-era Congress passed the 1871 Act pursuant to the fourteenth amendment 5 to guarantee a forum in which newly freed slaves could
secure their federal rights. The federal courts now must determine whether
the Congress of 1871 intended to protect only constitutional rights or statuThe 1964 U.S.C.A. notes only 19 decisions based upon § 1983 of Title 42 of the United

States Code for the first 65 years of the statute's existence. The 1976 edition of the U.S.C.A.,
however, cites over 700 § 1983 cases. See Comment, Section 1983 and the New Supreme
Court: Cutting the Civil Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 49, 46-54 (1976)

[hereinafter cited as Section 1983]; Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of
Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486, 1486 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Limiting the Section
1983 Action].
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985(c) (1976). Sections 1983 and 1985(c) originated in §§ 1 & 2
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The Supreme
Court has held that these statutes provide no substantive rights but rather provide a cause
of action for the violation of federal rights created by the Constitution. Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-20 (1979). Thus, §§ 1983 & 1985(c) provide a remedy
rather than create rights. Id.; Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345,
2349 (1979).
3 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The full title of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is
one indication of the congressional intent behind its passage: "An Act to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other
Purposes." Id. The original purpose of the 1871 Act was to provide a remedy for the violation
of all federal rights existing in 1871. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871). Congress
passed the Act to preclude the southern states from denying newly freed slaves their federal
rights, especially those rights created by the fourteenth amendment. See Note, The Proper
Scope of the Civil Rights Act, 66 HARv. L. Rav. 1285, 1285-86 (1953). The goal of the fourteenth amendment was to guarantee that no person be denied his civil rights on the basis of
race. See generally Lippe, The Uneasy Partnership:The Balance of PowerBetween Congress
and the Supreme Court in Interpretationof the Civil War Amendments, 7 AKRON L. REV.
49, 49-66 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Lippe].
I Currently, petitioners bring actions under the 1871 Act for the violation of federal rights
having no relation to the civil rights which the Act originally sought to protect. See note 3
supra;see, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979) (suit seeking
to challenge state welfare regulation allegedly violative of Social Security Act). Claimants
have also asserted causes of action under § 1985(c) for the violation of rights created by
subsequent civil rights legislation. See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny,
99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979) (plaintiff asserted cause of action under § 1985(c) for alleged violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). See generally Aldisert, JudicialExpansion of
FederalJurisdiction:A FederalJudge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal
Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 55 [hereinafter cited as Aldisert]; Note, DevelopmentsSection 1983, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress
the power to pass legislation to prevent denial of equal rights on the basis of race, color or
previous condition of servitude. See Lippe, supra note 3, at 49.
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tory rights as well.6 Since the early 1950's, courts steadily have expanded
both the constitutional and statutory rights protected by the 1871 Act,7
now codified at sections 1983 and 1985(c) of Title 42 of the United States
Code.' In the 1978-79 Term, the Supreme Court declined two opportunities
to define the specific federal rights which come within the protection of the
current statutes derived from the 1871 Act
The discrepancy in language between the 1871 Act and the current
codification has complicated the interpretation of section 1983,1 which was
derived from section 1 of the 1871 Act." Section 1 of the 1871 Act provided
a cause of action for the deprivation by state action"2 of any right created
by the Constitution and granted concurrent original jurisdiction over the
cause of action to the federal courts.' 3 Section 1 of the 1871 Act did not
explicitly provide a cause of action for the deprivation of statutorily created rights.'4 In 1874, Congress codified existing federal laws into the ReThe original drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 sought to provide a federal remedy
where a state law or regulation violated a federal right and in circumstances where no
adequate state remedy existed or where a theoretically adequate state remedy was unavailable. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961). See generally Limiting the Section
1983 Action, supra note 1, at 1486-94; note 3 supra.
I The Court has removed restrictions on § 1983 actions which previously limited the
scope of the statute. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court held that
§ 1983 provides a remedy supplemental to any state judicial remedy. Id. at 173-76. The
Monroe opinion implied that a plaintiff need not exhaust the state judicial remedies available
to him before seeking redress under § 1983. Id.; accord, McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S.
668, 672 (1963). The Monroe Court established the immunity of municipalities and certain
government officials and thus limited the scope of remedies available under § 1983. See
Limiting the Section 1983 Action, supra note 1, at 1486-88. Recently, however, the Supreme
Court overruled Monroe to the extent that Monroe held that municipalities were immune
from suit under § 1983. By denying immunity to a municipality in a § 1983 suit, the Court
expanded the scope of defendants subject to § 1983, holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1871
extended to local as well as state governments. Monell v. Department of Social Serv. of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978). See Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 213, 214-15 (1979).
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985(c) (1976). Section 1983 provides that any person who, under
color of state law, deprives another of any "rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws" is liable to the person deprived for the resulting injury. 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976). 1985(c) provides that any person involved in a conspiracy to deny equal protection of the laws to any person or class of persons is liable for the damages resulting from the
conspiracy. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976); see note 3 supra.
9 The Supreme Court decided Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600
(1979) and Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979), on narrow
grounds and thus avoided defining the scope of §§ 1983 & 1985(c), respectively. See also
Tongol v. Usery, 601 F.2d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1979); note 35 infra.
10See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608-11 (1979); text
accompanying notes 25-32 infra.
" See text accompanying note 13 infra.
12 See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) (Court construed color of state
law language of § 1983 identically with state action language of fourteenth amendment);
Section 1983, supra note 1, at 51 n.16.
'3 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 1, 17 Stat. 13.
441 U.S. at 608.
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vised Statutes. 5 The drafters of the Revised Statutes divided section 1 of
the 1871 Act into one substantive and two jurisdictional sections. 6 At the
same time, the drafters added the language "and laws" to the substantive
section 7 and to the section granting jurisdiction to the district courts." To
the section granting jurisdiction to the circuit courts the drafters added the
more precise language of "and laws providing for equal rights."' 9 In the
Judicial Code of 191120 Congress retained the "equal rights" language of
the former circuit court jurisdictional statute.2 ' The language of current
section 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, section 1343(3) of Title 28,2
is identical to that of the corresponding Revised Statutes, sections 1979
and 629.2 Although section 1985(c), derived from section 2 of the 1871 Act,
underwent the same series of codifications, the language of the current
statute is not significantly different from that of the 1871 Act. 4
The plain language of section 1983 provides a cause of action for a
deprivation by state action of any right created by the Constitution or
federal law.? The purpose and history of the 1871 Act,26 as well as the
" 18 Stat., No. 1, 1, 94, 109, 348 (1874).

"See Dwan & Feidler, The FederalStatutes-Their History and Use, 22 MINN. L. REV.
1008, 1012-15 (1938).
11The substantive section, § 1979, of the Revised Statutes contains the added "and laws"
language and corresponds exactly with § 1983 of the current United States Code. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); note 8 s-upra.
" REv. STAT. § 563 (1874) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976)).
, Rav. STAT. § 629 (1874) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976)).
25 Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087.
21 Rv.STAT. § 629 (1874) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976)). Justice Powell
suggested that the circuit court jurisdictional statute was more carefully drafted and, thus,
more accurate than the district court jurisdictional statute. Justice Powell contended that
Congress intentionally chose to retain the more precise language when the Judicial Code of
1911 consolidated the district and circuit courts. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 624-29 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). The organization of the judiciary
initially provided for two types of trial courts-district and circuit courts.-The circuit courts
had original as well as appellate jurisdiction in civil, admiralty and maritime cases. See P.
BATOR, P. Mismcnq, D. SHmo & H. WECHsLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SySTEM 33-41 (2d ed. 1973). The Judicial Code of 1911 abolished these circuit
courts and consolidated their jurisdiction in the district courts. Act of Mar. 3;1911, ch. 231,
36 Stat. 1087, 1167.
n 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976). Section 1343(3) grants original jurisdiction to the district
courts over any civil action authorized by law for the deprivation by state action of any right
secured by the Constitution or any law "providing for equal rights." Id.
u Section 1343(3) corresponds with the language of Revised Statute § 629. Compare 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) with REv. STAT. § 629 (1874). See generally Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1979).
2,In the Revised Statutes, current § 1985(c) appeared as § IS 30. Section 2 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 originally contained the equal protection language of § 1985(c) and the
drafters of the Revised Statutes made no language changes from that of the original Act. Act
of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13; see note 8 supra.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). A straightforward reading of § 1983 arguably results in the
statute providing a remedy for violation of any federal right, constitutional or statutory .This
interpretation rests upon the belief that Congress intended a literal reading of the statute.
See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 649-50 (1979) (White, J., concur-
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language of the jurisidictional counterpart 7 to section 1983, however, suggest interpreting section 1983 to encompass only constitutionally created
rights."8 Concurring in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Organization," Justice Powell viewed the restrictive "equal rights" language of section 1343(3) as an attempt by the drafters of the Revised
Statutes to limit the scope of the remedy to violations of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 Section 1985(c) provides a
cause of action against any person involved in a conspiracy designed to
deny "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the law. ' 3
Unlike section 1343(3), the equal protection language of section 1985(c) has
been a part of the statute since its inception in 1871.32 Although no language discrepancy exists between the 1871 Act and the current codification, problems remain in interpreting the language to ascertain the scope
of protection. The equal protection language of section 1985(c) and the
close relationship in origin and purpose between the 1871 Act and the
fourteenth amendment 33 suggest that only constitutional violations give
rise to a cause of action urider section 1985(c) . The Supreme Court must
therefore determine which statutory rights, if any, give rise to causes of
action under sections 1983 and 1985(c).3
In Chapman,6 the Supreme Court failed to resolve whether the violaring); text accompanying notes 87-96 infra.
21 See note 3 supra.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976). See note 22 supra. The Supreme Court has recognized §
1343(3) as the historical counterpart to § 1983. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405
U.S. 538, 540, 543 (1971).
"' See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 627 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring). Throughout the codifications, Congress never intended to change the literal
meaning of the original act. Id. at 627 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring). The notes of the drafters
of the Revised Statutes evidence no intent to effect a change in the meaning of the statute.
See 1 Revision of the United States Statutes as Drafted by the CommissionersApproved for
that Purpose 361 (1872), cited in 441 U.S. 600, 631 n.11 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). Thus
the congressional purpose in passing the 1871 Act was to secure fourteenth amendment rights
by providing a means to redress deprivations of constitutional rights by the states. Id. at 62737 (Powell, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 63-72 infra.
22441 U.S. 600 (1979).
1 Id. at 643 (Powell, J., concurring); accord, McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983:
Limitationson JudicialEnforcement of ConstitutionalClaims, PartI, 60 VA. L. REv. 1 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as McCormack].
3142 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976).
32 See note 24 supra.
3 See text accompanying note 5 supra.
3'See text accompanying notes 73-86 infra. Justices Powell and Stevens, in their concurring opinions in Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979), stated
that, based upon the legislative history and the language of the statute, § 1985(c) should
provide remedies solely for the violations of fundamental constitutional rights. Id. at 2352
(Powell, J., concurring), 2355 (Stevens, J., concurring).
35 See, e.g., Tongol v. Usery, 601 F.2d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Chapman Court's
failure to define extent to which § 1983 provides cause of action for violation of federal
statutory rights). See also text accompanying notes 97-100 infra.
3, 441 U.S. 600 (1979). In Chapman, the Supreme Court consolidated cases from the
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tion of a purely statutory federal right gives rise to a section 1983 suit.37
The Chapman petitioners asserted a cause of action under section 1983 for
alleged violations of the Social Security Act" by state welfare regulations.
The state regulations39 were promulgated pursuant to the authority of the
states to develop guidelines to administer the Social Security program
providing Aid to Families with Dependent Children." Writing for the
Court, Justice Stevens acknowledged that a section 1983 action might not
41
be appropriate to redress the violation of the Social Security Act. The
Supreme Court, however, assuming the existence of a valid section 1983
action, held that the district courts lacked original jurisdiction over the
action when the right allegedly violated was not created by the Constitution or a law providing for equal or civil rights. 2 Thus the Court made a
Third and Fifth Circuits. The petitioners in both cases claimed that the state had administered the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program according to regulations which
were more restrictive than required by the Social Security Act. The petitioners therefore
claimed that these state regulations violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 606 (e)(1) & 602 (a)(7) (1976)
respectively. 441 U.S. 600, 602-07 (1979). The decisions of the circuits conflicted on the issue
of whether federal district courts had original jurisdiction over such claims. Id. at 605-07. See
Houston Welfare Rights Org., Inc. v. Vowell, 555 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub
nom. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979); Gonzalez v. Young, 560
F.2d 164, 167-68 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org.,
441 U.S. 600 (1979).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See note 8 supra.
441 U.S. 600, 603-07 (1979); 42 U.S.C. §§ 602 (a)(7) & 606 (e)(1) (1976). The Supreme
Court has held that the Social Security Act does not provide equal rights but only governs
the dispensation of federal funds. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 292'(1971) (Burger,
C.J., concurring). Therefore, if § 1983 is restrictively interpreted to protect only constitutional
rights and rights created by laws providing for equal rights, the petitioners in Chapmanwould
not have a valid cause of action under § 1983.
3, N.J.A.C. § 10.82-5.12 (1976); Texas Dept. of Public Welfare, FINANCIAL SERVICES
HANDBOOK, Rev. 23 §§ 3122 & 3122.2, cited in Houston Welfare Rights, Org., Inc. v. Vowell,
555 F.2d at 1222 nn.4 & 5.
40 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1976). Aid to Families with Dependent Children is a program
of public welfare established under Part A of the Social Security Act and administered
through federally approved state plans. The purpose of the program is to encourage family
unity. Id. at § 601 (1976).
" 441 U.S. at 611-12. Following a lengthy discussion of §§ 1983 & 1343(3), the majority
concluded that the intent and policy of the legislation was ambiguous and offered little
guidance to resolving the issue of the proper scope of § 1983. Id. at 607-12; see note 38 supra;
text accompanying notes 63-72 infra.
42 441 U.S. at 623. The Court reasoned that a supremacy clause claim was not a sufficient
constitutional basis to grant jurisdiction under § 1343(3). Id. at 618. Further, jurisdiction
could not be granted pursuant to § 1343(3) or (4). Section 1343(4) grants jurisdiction to the
district courts over any civil action authorized by law for the deprivation of any right created
by any law protecting civil rights. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1976). The violation of the Social
Security Act or § 1983 does not fulfill the requirements of the language of § 1343(3) & (4)
since neither the Social Security Act nor § 1983 provides for equal or civil rights. 441 U.S. at
616-18. Thus, the Chapman Court rejected all grounds of jurisdiction alleged by the petitioners.
Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, however, have granted jurisdiction over welfare
claims pursuant to § 1343(3) & (4). In Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974), the Fourth
Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction over a challenge to state welfare laws
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jurisdictional determination to limit access to the federal courts but
stopped short of denying access to all litigants attempting to vindicate a
federal statutory right.4"
The Court came closer to confronting the issue of the proper scope of
section 1985(c)" in Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association
v. Novotny.45 Novotny, an employee of Great American Federal (GAF),
claimed damages under section 1985(c) asserting that GAF had conspired
to deprive him of equal protection of the laws. Petitioner's suit was based
upon a right-to-sue letter obtained under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 19646 (1964 Act). Petitioner alleged that GAF had terminated his employment because of his opposition to GAF employment practices which
violated Title VII of the 1964 Act.47 The Court held that section 1985(c)
pursuant to § 1343(3). The court based its decision on the fact that §§ 1983 & 1343(3) have
identical origins and should have the same scope. Further, the court reasoned that Congress
intended to retain the coextensive nature of the two statutes in the Revised Statutes and,
thus, §§ 1983 & 1343(3) should be broadly interpreted. Id. at 836-37. Having found jurisdiction on a statutory basis, the Fourth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether a supremacy
clause claim was a valid basis for jurisdiction under § 1343(3). The court noted, however, that
the supremacy clause negates state laws inconsistent with federal law and therefore federal
law is "secured by the Constitution". The Fourth Circuit indicated that a supremacy clause
claim would be sufficient grounds for invoking § 1343(3) jurisdiction. Id. at 843-44. See
generally Note, The Propriety of Granting a Federal Hearing for Statutorily Based Actions
Under the Reconstruction-EraCivil Rights Act: Blue v. Craig, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1343
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Statutorily Based Actions].
In Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969), the Fifth
Circuit based a finding of jurisdiction on § 1343(4) for a cause of action arising under § 1983.
The claim arose over an alleged deprivation of laborers' rights provided by the Wagner-Peyser
Act of 1933. 29 U.S.C. § 49 (1976). This act protects migratory workers from unfair wages
and working conditions. The court concluded that the rights violated were personal and thus
protected under § 1983. 417 F.2d at 579. Since § 1343(4) grants jurisdiction over any deprivation of rights created by a law protecting civil rights and § 1983 is such a law, jurisdiction
was found to flow naturally from § 1343(4). 417 F.2d at 580 n.39. See generallyHerzer, Federal
Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Herzer]. .
:3 See text accompanying notes 63-72 infra.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976); see text accompanying note 31 supra.
4599 S. Ct. 2345 (1979).
46 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). Congress enacted Title VII as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in order to eliminate discriminatory employment practices based on race,
color, religion, national origin or sex. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted
in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2401. In order to administer the provisions of
Title VII, the 1964 Act created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
The EEOC is authorized to investigate charges of discrimination, to attempt to conciliate the
parties involved, and to bring civil actions against the employer, if necessary. See Comment,
The Permissible Scope of Title VII Actions, 8 SrroN HALL L. REv. 493, 493-94 (1977). To
institute a private suit under Title VII the injured party must first file a charge with the
EEOC and obtain a "right-to-sue" letter from the commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1976).
'7 99 S. Ct. at 2347, The petitioner alleged that Great American Federal deliberately
followed policies which effectively denied female employees equal employment opportunities.
Id.
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does not provide a cause of action for rights created by Title VII because
of Title VII's explicit administrative scheme.48 The Court did not expand
its holding to define the federal rights protected by section 1985(c)."
The Novotny opinion addressed the narrowest issue possible in order
to resolve the case." While determining that a violation of Title VII would
not give rise to a section 1985(c) cause of action, the Court failed to resolve
the issue of the validity of a section 1985(c) action to redress the violation
of any statutorily created right.5 The federal courts must define what
federal rights section 1985(c) protects in order to achieve a certainty and
unity in the federal court system. 52 Although the Novotny opinion discussed both the legislative and judicial history of the 1871 Act,53 the Court
primarily relied on the notion that allowing a section 1985(c) action to
redress a violation of Title VII would nullify the administrative restraints
of Title VII 4 Although six Justices joined in the Novotny opinion, at least
two of these Justices, along with the three dissenting Justices, advocated
that the Court define the scope of section 1985(c).11 The NovotnY majority
recognized the issue and attempted to provide a partial solution to the
problem by holding that section 1985(c) does not protect the rights provided by Title VII 6 By basing its conclusion solely on the unique characteristics of Title VII and the facts of the case, 7 the Novotny Court neglected to take advantage of the opportunity to eliminate the confusion
which surrounds the post-Civil War civil rights legislation.58
, Id. at 2352. The circuit court had concluded that Title VII does not preclude a claim
under § 1985(c). Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 584 F.2d 1235, 1252-53 (3d
Cir. 1978). The court based this conclusion in part upon the legislative history of Title VII
that explicitly stated that Congress did not intend to repeal existing civil rights laws by
enacting Title VII. Id. at 1252; see 118 CoNG. REC. 3371 (1972); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1974) (Congress rejected amendment to 1964 Act making Title VII
exclusive remedy for unlawful employment practices). The Novotny Court attempted to
distinguish Alexander on the basis that the petitioner in Alexander had two independent
claims, whereas Novotny had only one. 99 S. Ct. at 2349, 2352. See also note 93 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 50-58 infra.
See note 48 supra.
" 99 S. Ct. at 2352 (Powell, J., concurring).
52 See text accompanying notes 101-113 infra.
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. See text accompanying notes 3-6 supra.
5 99 S. Ct. at 2351. Title VII provides for a very short and precise statute of limitations,
no right to a jury trial, and a very limited amount of damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
Plaintiffs under § 1985(c) actions are entitled to a jury trial and to compensatory damages.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976). See Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345,
2350-51 (1979).
1 In Novotny, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rhenquist and
Stevens joined in Justice Stewart's decision. Justices Powell and Stevens each filed concurring opinions criticizing the Court's failure to address the scope of § 1985(c). 99 S. Ct. at 2352
(Powell, J., concurring), 2353 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice White, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, wrote a dissenting opinion disagreeing with both the result reached
by the Court and the issue addressed. Id. at 2356 (White, J., dissenting).
1, Id. at 2352.
51See note 93 infra.

99 S. Ct. at 2352-53 (Powell, J., concurring), 2353-56 (Stevens, J., concurring), 2358-
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The Supreme Court's definition of the scope of the 1871 Act will depend
upon the degree of access to the federal courts desired by the Supreme
Court. The trend of the Burger Court has been to limit general access to
the federal courts. 59 The Chapman and Novotny decisions" have perpetuated the trend, but the reluctance to deny access indicates a split in the
Court over the underlying policy." The concurring and dissenting opinions
in Chapman and Novotny revealed the results sought by and the philosophies of the individual Justices.62 A careful analysis of the alternatives
suggested by these opinions may help predict which course the Court eventually will take when confronting the scope of the 1871 Act.
Justice Powell's approach characterizes the trend toward restricting
access to the federal courts through narrow application of sections 1983 and
1985(c).13 This restrictive approach, illustrated by Justice Powell's con61 (White, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 74-96 infra.
11 The Burger Court generally disaaproves of federal courts' interference in state matters.
See Landever, Perceptionsof JudicialResponsibility-The Views of the Nine United States
Supreme Court Justices As They Consider Claims in FourteenthAmendment Noncriminal
Cases: A Post-Bakke Evaluation, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1097, 1151-52 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Landever]. The Court tends to defer to the state courts in cases in which the federal
and state courts have jurisdiction and to deny access to the federal courts when feasible. See
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-99 (1976). See generally Morrison, Rights Without Remedies:
The Burger Court Takes the Federal Courts Out of the Business of ProtectingFederalRights,
30 RUTGERS L. REv. 841 (1977). The Court thus may be expected to interpret the statutes
derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as narrowly as possible. See text accompanying
notes 60-83 infra. But see Monell v. Department of Social Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
701 (1978) (Court broadened applicability of § 1983 by stripping municipalities of immunity
from suit).
0 The Court did not completely deny the welfare litigant access to the federal courts in
Chapman but merely required that the litigant allege a constitutional claim to which the
court could attach pendant jurisdiction over the statutory claim. 441 U.S. at 612-21. See also
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1974) (district court has original jurisdiction over
statutory claim pendent to not wholly insubstantial constitutional claim).
" In Chapman, Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court, with Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rhenquist joining in the opinion. Justice White concurred in the judgment but filed a separate opinion. Justice White asserted that the Court
could not resolve the issue of jurisdiction until it resolved the issue of the validity of a § 1983
cause of action. Id. at 647 (White, J., concurring). Justice Powell, criticized Justice White's
analysis of the scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as unnecessary to the case and unable to
"stand the test of time". Id. at 624 (Powell, J., concurring). Implicit in Justice Powell's
concern with Justice White's analysis is the idea that the majority's refusal to define the scope
of the Act is also unsatisfactory. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
not only disagreed with the result the Court reached, but also with the majority's refusal to
determine whether a cause of action existed. Id. at 672-76 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
62 See text accompanying notes 63-96 infra.
3 See note 59 supra. Justice Powell touches lightly on the policy and pragmatic reasons
for his position in Chapman. See 441 U.S. at 645 (Powell, J., concurring). Proponents of the
policy of federalism favor allowing state courts to settle controversies such as those involved
in Chapman without interference from the federal government. See McCormack, supra note
30, at 1-4.
Judge Aldisert of the Third Circuit who initially denied jurisdiction to one of the petitioners in Chapman espoused a similar policy. See Gonzalez v. Young, 560 F.2d 160, 167 (3d Cir.
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currence in Chapman, depends primarily upon the history of the drafting
of the Revised Statutes64 to reach the conclusion that the discrepancy in
language was merely an oversight and that the added language in both
sections 1983 and 1343(3) should be interpreted as a reference to laws
providing for equality of civil rights.5 The 1871 Act granted the circuit and
district courts concurrent jurisdiction over causes of action under section
1983.66 In order to compensate for the states' inability or refusal to enforce
federal rights, the revised jurisdictional statutes 7 must have had identical
scope." The drafters of the Revised Statutes added the equal rights language to the jurisdictional section to avoid too narrow an interpretation by
the courts and to ensure application of the statutes to deprivations of equal
rights." Proponents of the restrictive approach argue that the "and laws"
language of section 1979,1° the revised substantive statute, must receive the
same narrow reading as the identical language in the district court jurisdictional statute.71 Thus, the restrictive approach would allow a section 1979
cause of action for the deprivation of a constitutional right or a right
created by a federal law providing for equal rights. 2
The restrictive approach, advocated by Justices Powell and Stevens
concurring in Novotny, next assesses the scope of section 1985(c), which
contains equal rights language analogous to that of the jurisdictional statute." Justice Powell agreed with the majority in Novotny that a violation
of Title VII does not give rise to a cause of action under section 1985(c).11
Justice Powell expressed dissatisfaction, however, with the Court's refusal
1977). See generally Aldisert, supra note 4, at 562. But see Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. at 672-76 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices in Chapman
favor an interpretation of §§ 1983 & 1343(3) which would afford litigants attempting to
vindicate their federal rights liberal access to the federal court system. Id. See also Houston
Welfare Rights Org., Inc. v. Vowell, 555 F.2d 1219, 1220 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977).
1 See text accompanying notes 16-24 supra.
65441 U.S. at 634-35 (Powell, J., concurring); cf. Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero,
426 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1976) (§§1983 & 1343(3) intended to have identical scopes).
"6See text accompanying notes 13-24 supra.
67

See notes 18 & 19 supra.

'5See note 21 supra.
', The drafters of the Revised Statutes clearly explained the intent of the language
modification in the circuit court jurisdictional statute. REv. STAT. § 629 (1874). See note 28
supra. Thus the language of REv. STAT. § 563 should be construed identically with § 629 since
both jurisdictional sections were intended to be identical in scope. 441 U.S. 600, 634-35
(Powell, J., concurring).
10 See note 17 supra.

1 441 U.S. at 633-34 (Powell, J., concurring).
at 640 (Powell, J., concurring). Agreeing with the Chapman majority's conclusion
that the Social Security Act is not a law providing for equal rights, Justice Powell would have
been forced by his restrictive interpretatin of § 1983 to conclude that the petitioners in
Chapman had no valid cause of action under § 1983.
7 See text accompanying notes 24 & 30-32 supra.
1' 99 S. Ct. at 2352-53 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell argued that only a violation
of a fundamental constitutional right gives rise to a cause of action under § 1985(c). Id. A
violation of Title VII does not create a cognizable § 1985(c) claim. Id. See also note 8 supra.
72 Id.
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to define whether section 1985(c) protects any statutory rights. 75 Although
the language of the statute is clear, 76 the restrictive approach would limit
the statute to provide a remedy solely for the violation of constitutional
rights. 7 Justice Powell supported limiting the scope of the statute to constitutional rights by relying on the rationale of the Supreme Court in
Griffin v. Breckenridge.7" The Griffin Court, holding that section 1985(c)
protects the constitutional right to interstate travel, 79 justified congressional authority to enact sections 1983 and 1985(c) by identifying Congress'
power to protect specific constitutional rights."0 The Griffin Court's reasoning that section 1985(c) is constitutional because it protects "basic rights"
compelled Powell's conclusion that section 1985(c) protects only constitutional rights."'
Justice Stevens' concurrence in Novotny supported the restrictive approach by relying primarily on an analysis of congressional intent.12 Justice
Stevens reasoned that regardless of the slightly different language of sections 1983 and 1985(c), Congress intended the sections to have identical
scope.0 Congress passed the 1871 Act to provide federal remedies for deprivations of constitutional rights, especially those protected by the fourteenth amendment." Justice Stevens distinguished section 1983 from section 1985(c) by noting that section 1983 creates a remedy for a deprivation
by state action whereas section 1985(c) creates a remedy for a deprivation
by a private conspiracy.85 Justice Stevens' interpretation of the two statutes providing remedies solely for the protection of constitutional rights 8
"' See 99 S. Ct. at 2352 (Powell, J., concurring); text accompanying note 97 infra.
7' See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
7 99 S. Ct. at 2352 (Powell, J., concurring).
78 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In Griffin, the victim of a conspiracy against civil rights workers
asserted a claim under § 1985(c). The Supreme Court granted the claimant relief based on
the violation of his right to interstate travel, identified by the Court as among the rights and
privileges of national citizenship. Id. at 105-06. Justice Powell based his conclusion that §
1985(c) reaches only constitutional rights on the somewhat vague constitutional language of
Griffin. 99 S. Ct. at 2353 (Powell, J., concurring).
"' Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 105-06.
Id. at 106.

99 S. Ct. at 2352-53 (Powell, J., concurring).
See Great Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345, 2354-55 (1979) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
13 Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens criticized the Court for not
resolving the basic issue of the scope of § 1985(c). Justice Stevens concluded that § 1985(c)
only protects fundamental constitutional rights and that § 1983 should also be restrictively
interpreted. Id. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Chapman, did not resolve the scope
of § 183. 441 U.S. at 616. However, in his concurrence in Novotny, Justice Stevens indicated
that he would adopt Justice Powell's approach in Chapman and would interpret both statutes
to protect constitutional rights, including those protected by the fourteenth amendment. 99
S. Ct. at 2354 (Stevens, J., concurring). See Landever, supranote 59, at 1142 (Justice Stevens'
reluctance to loosely interpret post-civil war legislation).
"
'

See note 3 supra.
"

99 S. Ct. at 2354 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 2355 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally McCormack, supra note 30, at 2-4.
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would limit access to the federal courts to the greatest extent possible.
Justice White's policy of giving literal effect to the most recent language enacted by Congress 7 exemplifies a less result-oriented approach.
Concurring in Chapman, Justice White examined the history of the enactment of the 1871 Act and the subsequent codifications, and concluded that
Congress, in adopting the Revised Statutes, meant to include all federal
statutory rights under the protection of the predecessor to section 1983.88
Under the literal approach, past Court decisions have supported extension
of section 1983 to both constitutional and statutory rights." Justice White,
finding no basis for looking beyond the clear meaning of the statute, rejected the contention that section 1983 should encompass only laws which
provide for equal rights.
Dissenting in Novotny, Justice White favored a broad, literal reading
of section 1985(c) to allow statutory protection to encompass all federal
rights including those rights statutorily created subsequent to passage of
the 1871 Act.' This literal approach would interpret the explicit equal
protection language of section 1985(c) as evincing a congressional intent
that the alleged conspiracy have an invidiously discriminatory motive.2
Since an alleged wrong would not always give rise to overlapping remedies
under section 1985(c) and Title VII,11 the Court should not exclude statu441 U.S. at 649 (1979) (White, J., concurring). The Chdbinan opinion acknowledged
that the most recent language 'f §§ 1983 & 1343(3) adopted by Congress should not be
ignored. The Court pointed out that coextensive interpretation of §§ 1983 & 1343(3) would
require ignoring the actual language of one of the sections. Id. at 616. Justice Stewart argued,
however, that failure to interpret §§ 1983 & 1343(3) coextensively would require ignoring
congressional intent and the common origin of the statutes. Id. at 674 (Stewart,J., dissenting).
u Id. at 658 (White, J., concurring). Agreeing with the majority's literal interpretation
of § 1343(3), Justice White argued that the legislative history provides no basis for ignoring
the plain language of § 1983. Id. at 658-59 (White, J., concurring). Congress enacted the
present language of both §§ 1983 & 1343(3) in the Revised Statutes and that language
remained unchanged throughout subsequent enactments of the United States Code. Id. at
657-58 (White, J,, concurring). See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
" 441 U.S. at 658-60 (White, J., concurring). The Suprme Court has granted relief in the
past for violation of a statutory right under § 1983. The statutes in issue were not laws
securing equal rights. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970) (suit to secure
compliance with Social Security Act proper under § 1983); City of Greenwood v. Peacock,
384 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1966) (state government officials liable under § 1983 for damages
resulting from violation of federal statutory rights).
t0 441 U.S. at 665-72 (White, J., concurring). Justice White rejected as irrelevant any
consideration of the intent of the drafters in interpreting § 1983 or § 1343(3) so long as the
meaning of the statute is clear on its face. Thus, in the absence of any ambiguity and in light
of a confusing and contradictory history, the statute should be given a literal interpretation.
Id. Contra, Levi, An Introductionto Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Cm. L. Rav. 501, 520-23 (1948)
(consideration of intent essential to statutory interpretation).
" 99 S. Ct. at 2358 (White, J., dissenting).
'z Id. at 2360-61 (White, J., dissenting).
'3 Id. at 2357-58 (White, J., dissenting). Only the unique fact situation of Novotny
resulted in the petitioner having valid causes of action under both Title VII and § 1985(c).
Novotny was deprived of his Title VII right not to be discriminated against due to his aiding
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tory rights from section 1985(c) protection. Furthermore, the damages recoverable by a plaintiff under section 1985(c) and Title VII would be different. 4 Finally, Justice White cited the Court's basic policy disfavoring the
implied repeal of a statute by a later statute. 5 Extending the protection
of section 1985(c) to Title VII rather than implying that Title VII preempts
the alternative means of redress under section 1985(c), would advance the
policy against implied repeal.
Justice Powell expressed his concern in Novotny that the Supreme
Court, by avoiding the issue of the proper scope of sections 1983 and
1985(c), has not provided sufficient guidance to the federal courts. 7 A
Ninth Circuit case, Tongol v. Usery,95 illustrates the quandary of the lower
courts. Attempting to determine whether the petitioners had asserted a
valid claim under section 1983, the Ninth Circuit looked to the Supreme
Court for guidance concerning what federal rights are protected by section
1983. Citing Chapman, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Supreme
Court had not yet resolved the question. 9 The Tongol court had to predict
women employees in asserting their Title VII rights. Thus, Novotny had a valid Title VII
action. Id. at 2357. Additionally, Novotny asserted a cause of action under § 1985(c) since he
had been injured as a result of the GAF conspiracy to violate the women employees' Title
VII rights. Novotny would have no cause of action under Title VII for the damage caused by
the conspiracy unless, as in this case, the damage was caused by retaliatory discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). 99 S. Ct. at 2356-57 (White, J., dissenting).
94A plaintiff may seek compensatory and punitive damages from parties who have allegedly violated his rights under § 1985(c). See 99 S. Ct. at 2351. A claim under Title VII entitles
the plaintiff to equitable relief which includes back pay for a period of up to two years. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Justice White argued that these two types of relief are supplemental to one another rather than exclusive. 99 S. Ct. at 2359 (White, J., dissenting). Contra,
Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 833 (1976) (Title VII remedy held exclusive because of express
legislative intent).
"599 S. Ct. at 2358-59 (White, J., dissenting). When a statute irreconcilably conflicts
with a prior statute the question of whether the former statute repeals the latter statute arises.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 n.10 (1976). A court will attempt to interpret the
statutes so that an irreconcilable conflict does not arise. If a court cannot reconcile the
statutes it will attempt to determine how Congress intended the two statutes to interrelate.
See Note, Section 1981 and the Thirteenth Amendment After Runyon v. McCrary-On the
Doorsteps of DiscriminatoryPrivate Clubs, 29 STAN. L. REv. 747, 777-82 (1977). Thus courts
follow a policy which favors reconciling statutes rather than allowing a statute to repeal a
former statute without an express provision to that effect. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross
& Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1976); United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S.
164, 168 (1976).
95 99 S. Ct. at 2358-60 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White urged the Court to eliminate
the possibility of an implied repeal of § 1985(c) by Title VII by interpreting § 1985(c) compatibly with Title VII. Id. at 2360 (White, J., dissenting).
"7See text accompanying note 7 supra. See generally Baum, Lower Court Response to
Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYs. J. 208 (1978).
" 601 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1979). In Tongol, the court decided that a petitioner's successful
challenge of a federal regulation dealing with unemployment benefits gave rise to a cause of
action under § 1983. Id. at 1100. A valid.cause of action under § 1983 is necessary to entitle a
petitioner to recover attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
11 601 F.2d at 1099.
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1
which approach to the issue the Supreme Court would ultimately adopt.'0
The division among the Justices in Chapman and Novotny and the resulting uncertainty of the circuit courts should have served to alert the Supreme Court that the federal courts need guidance if the federal judicial
system is to retain the desired uniformity.
In determining which interpretation of the statutes to adopt, the Supreme Court must consider whether to give effect solely to the language of
the statutes or, more completely to the language, intent and purpose of the
legislation.'' The restrictive interpretation of the statute recognizes the
common origin of sections 1983, 1343(3) and 1985(c).02 The literal approach, on the other hand, lacks this depth and stability of analysis by
interpreting section 1983 to provide causes of action for .which section
1343(3) does not provide original jurisdiction in the district courts." 3 Proponents of a broad interpretation of the statute, as well as those favoring
the restrictive approach, recognize that an examination of the legislative
history dictates that the statutes be interpreted coextensively.", Additionally, limiting the rights protected by the statutes to constitutional rights
and equal rights'05 accomplishes the purpose of the 1871 Act. The Reconstruction Congress enacted the 1871 Act, not to create rights of action
against the state or private conspiracies for the violation of all federal
rights, but to ensure that citizens would have a federal forum in which to
secure their constitutional rights including the rights' secured by the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.'
Adoption of the restrictive approach advocated by Justices Powell and

INId. After reviewing the legislative history of § 1983, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Justice White's literal interpretation is correct. Id. The Ninth Circuit, holding that § 1983
provides a cause of action for the violation of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
Act of 1974, based this conclusion on the rationale that the history of § 1983 is sc contradictory
that the clearest indication of the proper scope of the section is the language itself. Id. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit probably would interpret § 1983 to provide a cause of action for the violation
of any constitutional or statutory right. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441
U.S. at 646-50 (White, J., concurring).
M01
See note 90 supra. See generally Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUm. L. REv. 527, 527-34, 538-45 (1947).
10 See text accompanying notes 64-72 supra.
"0 441 U.S. at 624 (Powell, J., concurring). The literal approach would interpret § 1983
as authorizing suits for violations of any federal -right while interpreting § 1343(3) to provide
original jurisdiction in the district courts only for suits to redress violations for rights created
by the Constitution or any law providing for equal rights. See note 61 supra. But see note
100 supra.
"I See Herzer, supra note 42, at 7-9; Statutorily Based Actions, supranote 42, at 137173; Note, FederalJurisdictionOver Challengesto State Welfare Programs,72 CoLUM. L. R.v.
1404, 1425-26 (1972).
"I Justice Powell noted that his definition of the scope of § 1983 leaves unresolved the
issue of what is meant by a law providing for equal rights. The opinion of the Court, holding
that the Social Security Act is not such a law, developed no guidelines for determining what
constitutes a law providing for equal rights. 441 U.S. at 637 n.20 (Powell, J., concurring).
" See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
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Stevens would advance favorable policy considerations.' 7 The practical
interest of the Court in restricting the case load borne by the federal court
system' 8 favors the restrictive analysis of the scope of the statutes.' 9 Limiting the scope of sections 1983 and 1985(c) would decrease the potential
number of cases which could be brought in federal court under the authority of-these statutes. The restrictive approach also finds support in the
basic concept of federalism which favors limited regulation of states by the
federal government." A literal interpretation of the statutes would provide
a federal cause of action for the violation, either by the state or by a
conspiracy, of any federal right. Proponents of federalism would prefer to
limit federal causes of action to those in which the federal government has
a unique interest."' Restricting the application of the statutes to violations
of equal and constitutional rights would protect the federal government's
interest in securing basic human rights while recognizing the general competence of the state court systems.
To ensure that the federal judiciary treats all petitioners equally, the
Supreme Court must define the precise rights giving rise to valid causes
of action under sections 1983 and 1985(c) .112 Defining the rights protected
by the statutes as constitutional and equal rights 3 would give effect to the
language and purpose of the drafters as well as advancing federalism and
relieving the burden on the federal court system.
KATHLEEN MARIE FENTON
107See text accompanying notes 63-72 supra.
10 See Aldisert, supra note 4, at 559. 87,000 cases were filed in federal district courts in

1972. Id.
"I' See text accompanying notes 63-86 supra.
110441 U.S. at 645 (Powell, J., concurring). See also McCormack, supra note 30, at 1;
text accompanying note 63 supra.
m See McCormack, supra note 30, at 2-4.
12 See notes 58 & 61 supra.
"1 See note 105 supra.

